Final Report of Investigation

PREPARED FOR THE CITY OF BOSTON:

Performance and Oversight of the School Bus Services Contract between Boston Public Schools & Transdev, N.A.

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I. INTRODUCTION

On May 23, 2025, the City of Boston engaged Mintz attorney Natashia Tidwell to conduct an independent investigation (the "**Investigation**") of the contractual relationship between the City's schools ("BPS") and its third-party provider of school bus transportation services, Transdev, N.A. (collectively, the "**Parties**"). *See* **Exhibit 1.** The Mintz team also included attorney Molly Connolly (collectively, the "**Investigators**"). The Investigation followed an April 28, 2025, traffic accident in which a BPS kindergartner was struck and killed by a school bus operated by a Transdev driver (the **"April 28 Incident**"). The Investigators were tasked with reviewing and evaluating Transdev's performance and BPS's oversight of the contract's safety-related provisions. This Report summarizes the Investigation and details the Investigators' findings and recommendations.

Section II of the Report explains the Investigation's scope and summarizes the information gathered from interviews of key BPS and Transdev personnel (past and present) as well as the Investigators' review of salient records. While the specific facts of the April 28 Incident (the subject of ongoing criminal and civil probes) were outside the Investigation's scope, the incident served as a tragic backdrop. Indeed, as previewed in the City's statement announcing the Investigation, some of the processes identified in this Report were implemented in the immediate aftermath of the April 28 Incident. As such, the Investigators sought to accurately capture measures attendant to both Transdev's performance under the contract and BPS's oversight of same as they existed *before* April 28, while also fairly acknowledging the work the Parties have done since that time to apply lessons learned and enhance school bus safety.

To better articulate the progress made and the growth opportunities that remain, this Report follows a similar, yet modified, *pre* and *post* framework with March 2023, when the Parties executed the current contract, serving as the central reference point. Section III provides a historical overview of the BPS/Transdev relationship and includes a summary of the initial 2013 contract, Transdev's performance struggles, BPS's search for an alternate vendor, and its ultimate decision to award Transdev a new contract following a procurement process from which Transdev emerged as the lone bidder. This historical context aided the Investigators in interpreting the current contract and served as prologue to the performance deficiencies identified later in this Report. The Investigation revealed that following an October 2020 internal safety audit (the "**2020 Audit**"), the Parties were on notice of Transdev's struggles to: (1) maintain "up to date" driver qualification files; (2) store driver training files in a readily accessible manner; (3) ensure accurate, complete, and timely reporting of accidents; and (4) consistently staff key safety positions. *See* **Exhibit 2**.

While an internal audit conducted in the aftermath of the April 28 Incident revealed that Transdev's driver qualification files are complete and "up to date," it appears that there has been limited progress in the remaining areas identified in October 2020 as areas of concern. As further detailed in Section IV, neither BPS nor Transdev could provide tangible evidence indicating that either conducted any subsequent assessment of these areas before the April 28 Incident.[1]

[1] BPS did provide reports stemming from a series of annual on-site assessments conducted by National Interstate, which had insured the BPS school bus fleet until June of this year.

The Investigation did reveal that in response to the October 2020 audit, BPS made significant effort to implement a number of performance and accountability metrics into its relationship with Transdev. Those efforts are evidenced by significant improvements in Transdev's on-time performance statistics and other areas. However, as relates to the concerns identified in the safety-related section of the October 2020 review, it appears that these performance metrics were folded into the 2023 contract and largely left for Transdev to execute. Section IV(C) provides an overview of BPS's current contract administration processes.

The Investigators did not have sufficient time to conduct a detailed audit of Transdev's systems. However, our review of a narrow subset of Transdev records coupled with our on-site observation of Transdev's record storage systems largely corroborated the 2020 Audit findings. Transdev's record keeping systems are cumbersome, accident report files are incomplete, and key safety and training positions are vacant or staffed by new hires.[2] Even if Transdev's safety and training programs were fully staffed, however, the Investigation revealed that full implementation of these initiatives would be impacted by the collective bargaining agreement between Transdev and BPS school bus drivers (the "**Driver CBA**"). In sum, the Investigators found that, despite the improvements made in key areas since 2023, including significant remedial efforts following the April 28 Incident, opportunities for growth remain. These observations and accompanying recommendations are detailed in Section IV.

II. SCOPE OF REVIEW

The Investigation took place over 60 days, concluding in substance on August 8, 2025, so that this Report could be released to BPS and the community before the start of the 2025-2026 school year. As indicated above, the abridged timeframe limited the Investigators' ability to fully evaluate Transdev's performance of several key contract provisions, including certain metrics typically associated with a transportation organization, such as On-Time Performance ("**OTP**").[3] As stated above, the April 28 Incident and its surrounding circumstances were not within the scope of this Investigation.

The Investigation included, but was not limited to, a review of the past and present contract between BPS and Transdev, the Driver CBA, Transdev's safety policies and procedures, data related to driver behavior and accident frequency, driver files, and past audits and assessments of Transdev. In recognition of the limited timeframe, both BPS and Transdev promptly acknowledged the Investigators' requests for documents and other information and made concerted efforts to respond promptly. As detailed in Section IV(A), BPS stores and maintains reports and other materials that Transdev is contractually required to produce each month but does not regularly receive or maintain driver training and credentialing records, accident reports, or safety policies and procedures. As such, the Investigators requested those materials from Transdev directly and

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[2] In December 2024, Transdev's Freeport bus yard ("**Freeport**") suffered a fire that resulted in the destruction of several driver files. Shortly thereafter, the administrator overseeing file management resigned from Transdev. Transdev officials told the Investigators that they are still working to determine the scope of the fire's damage and the feasibility of replicating any lost driver records.

[3] BPS recently reported significant progress in Transdev's achievement of OTP benchmarks. *See* Boston Public Schools, Driving Change: BPS Transportation Progress 2022–2025, https://www.bostonpublicschools.org/bps-departments/transportation/driving-change-bps-transportation-progress-2022-2025.

as detailed throughout this Report, occasionally experienced moderate delays in production. The documents referenced within this Report are included as **Exhibits 1-20.**

The Investigators interviewed multiple Transdev and BPS employees as well as members of Transdev's corporate leadership.[4] The interviewees were extremely cooperative and responsive to the Investigators' questions, readily admitting when an area of inquiry exceeded their scope of knowledge. All Transdev interviewees were accompanied by counsel. The Investigation also included an on-site meeting with key Transdev safety and management personnel at its Washington Street facility, where the Investigators observed Transdev's accident and training record keeping systems.[5] Lastly, the Investigators interviewed a transportation official from another urban school district who provided valuable insight based on his district's experiences.

III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE BPS/TRANSDEV RELATIONSHIP

According to its website, Transdev[6] is the largest private operator and integrator of multiple modes of public transportation in the United States, managing services across bus, paratransit, rail, non-emergency medical transport, micro-transit, shuttle, and autonomous vehicles.[7] Its clients include cities, counties, airports, universities, and private companies. Transdev also provides fleet maintenance and vehicle services. The company operates in 46 states, as well as Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico, and serves 400 cities throughout the United States. Relevant to this Report, BPS is the only client to which Transdev provides school bus transportation services.

BPS awarded a contract for school bus services to Transdev (the "**Original Contract**") in 2013, following a bid process that included three (3) other competing vendors. As part of the procurement process, interested vendors were informed that the prevailing bidder would have to agree to the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement ("**Driver CBA**") with BPS school bus drivers and comply with its terms.[8] The Original Contract was for five years with five (5) consecutive one-year (1-year) renewal options. It also incorporated by reference a series of specific safety-related provisions. Those provisions were detailed in materials accompanying Transdev's

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[4] Following the April 28 Incident, Transdev's Senior Safety Managers of Operations, who oversaw all safety training and coaching, began an extended leave and ultimately resigned after several years with Transdev. The Investigators attempted to reach him but did not receive a response.

[5] All other interviews were conducted via Zoom.

[6] In 2011, Transdev merged with Veolia Transport, becoming Veolia Transdev. The company existed in North America as Veolia Transportation until 2014, at which point it was rebranded to Transdev North America. Although the Parties to the 2013 contract were BPS and Veolia Transportation, subsequent renewals and negotiations took place after the 2014 rebranding. For purposes of this Report, "Transdev" includes Veolia Transportation.

[7] Transdev N. Am., *Key Facts*, Transdev (n.d.), https://transdevna.com/about-us/key-facts/.

[8] Although BPS bus drivers are Transdev employees, the services provided under the Driver CBA are for "the City of Boston." As described by one Transdev official, the City, BPS specifically, serves as a pass through for the financial-related provisions of the Driver CBA, meaning that Transdev must obtain BPS's approval to raise driver wages or to settle any monetary Union grievances. This trilateral arrangement's impact on Transdev's ability to manage drivers was identified by Transdev and BPS officials as a barrier to performance under the Original Contract, particularly the shared belief that the drivers' Union could bypass BPS and Transdev and bring grievances and other issues directly to the mayor's office for favorable resolution. While the New Contract has alleviated some of these concerns, for instance by adding provisions that prevent City officials from meeting with the drivers' Union without Transdev present, issues persist. The Driver CBA's impact on school bus services has been documented elsewhere and is detailed in this Report where relevant to the Investigators' review of the safety-related provisions of the current Transdev/BPS contract. *See generally infra* Section IV(C).

bid proposal which included its safety policies and procedures, safety training programs, and key safety personnel. BPS officials described this contract structure as generally ineffective, as the lack of a single, comprehensive contract containing all relevant provisions created confusing and/or contradictory mandates.

A. THE END OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT & BPS'S SEARCH FOR A NEW VENDOR

Transdev struggled to achieve several of the Original Contract's performance metrics, specifically as related to OTP. In the fall of 2019, the state's Department of Elementary and Secondary Education ("**DESE**") conducted a review of BPS highlighting "serious challenges and deficiencies across a broad range of district functions," including "poorly run operational functions, such as transportation and facilities management.[9]" In January 2020, National Interstate, BPS's insurance provider for its school bus fleet, issued its annual risk management report which identified as a "critical recommendation," the need for BPS, and by extension Transdev, to implement a "focused approach on retraining" drivers, post-accident or similar unsafe act, and to "review and revise" the retraining process to enhance driver development. *See* **Exhibit 3.** In its response to the insurer's concerns, BPS reaffirmed its commitment to "operating a safe, reliable transportation system" for its students and cited a series of measures it planned to implement to "hold Transdev accountable." *See* **Exhibit 4**. These measures included audits of different aspects of Transdev's operational performance including safety metrics related to accidents. *See id*.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting shutdown, the initial audit was not conducted until October 2020, following what is described as a "disastrous" start to the 2020-2021 school year. The 2020 Audit spurred a period of significant oversight of the Transdev contract by BPS that included monthly safety meetings and on-site visits. By June 2021, BPS had engaged a consulting firm to help weigh its available options, including whether to return delivery of school bus services back to BPS's control. Ultimately, BPS determined that the "in-house" option was not viable. So, the consulting firm analyzed the Original Contract and assisted BPS in developing both a procurement bid invitation for alternate vendors and the proposed structure for the next contract. The consulting firm delineated the challenges posed by the Original Contract structure that might impact the bidding process for the New Contract and recommended that the New Contract clearly outline the roles and responsibilities for both the vendor and BPS, streamline performance metrics for tracking the vendor's progress, and include a meaningful and result-focused incentive structure.

By the time the Parties executed the fifth and final renewal option of the Original Contract in July 2022, for the 2022-2023 school year, BPS was preparing to initiate its bid process to identify a new vendor. Shortly thereafter, in September 2022, BPS published its Invitation for Bids ("**IFB**"). Despite initial interest from 30 transportation companies, only four (4) joined a subsequent site visit to the BPS bus yards. Ultimately, when the deadline for submissions arrived in October 2022, only one company—Transdev—submitted a bid. At least one potential bidder cited the proposed contract's unfavorable terms and conditions and "the fact that the risks are far too great and the

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[9] Mass. Dep't of Elementary & Secondary Educ., District Review Report (2022), https://www.doe.mass.edu/accountability/district-review/nolevel/2022-0035.pdf. Rather than impose a receivership as an intervention, then-DESE Commissioner Jeffrey Riley opted to create a Memorandum of Understanding between DESE and BPS whereby the district agreed to improve its performance in the areas identified.

benefits far too few" as reasons for its decision to withdraw from consideration. *See* **Exhibit 5**. BPS officials told the Investigators that other interested vendors identified the Driver CBA as a significant barrier to their participation in the bid process.[10] On December 7, 2022, BPS notified Transdev that it was the successful bidder. The New Contract went into effect on July 1, 2023.

B. THE OCTOBER 2020 TRANSDEV AUDIT

In October 2020, BPS requested that Transdev conduct a comprehensive audit of its contract performance across multiple areas, including safety. According to BPS officials, the 2020 Audit was not tied to a specific inciting event but was instead prompted by ongoing performance issues that had existed since the contract's inception in 2013, primarily tied to OTP and related complaints from families.[11] The 2020 Audit consisted of a review of the Original Contract's six main Functional Areas: Safety, Human Resources, Finance, Maintenance, Operations, and Information Technology (individually "Functional Area," and collectively, the "**Functional Areas**"). For purposes of this Report, the audit findings related to the Safety and Human Resources Functional Areas were of particular importance.

The 2020 Audit revealed several deficiencies related to record keeping, safety staffing, and the impact of unionized workers on Transdev's ability to conduct effective training. *See* **Exhibit 2**. Other issues included outdated or incomplete driver files, poor documentation of training and accident investigations; insufficient coaching, and staffing vacancies in critical safety-related roles. *See id*.

After the 2020 Audit was completed, Transdev produced an improvement plan, which documented its proposed efforts to address the identified issues. At this time, BPS began a period of sustained oversight of Transdev's performance of the contract—a "trust but verify" approach, as explained by one BPS official. This approach reflected BPS's expectation that Transdev provide a more granular analysis of its improvement efforts and allowed BPS to better understand the ongoing gaps. According to this same BPS official and others, once it began seeing progress, BPS continued the cadence of monthly meetings with Transdev but returned responsibility for granular administration of the Original Contract back to Transdev.

C. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S AUDIT OF THE BID PROCESS

Shortly after the IFB process was completed, and BPS informed Transdev of its intention to award Transdev the contract, the state's Inspector General ("**OIG**") conducted an audit of the bid process. The OIG review stemmed from reports of complaints about Transdev's performance under the Original Contract as well as concerns about the bid process for the New Contract. OIG's audit included a review of the IFB specifications, the consulting firm's reports and memoranda, and Transdev's bid submission and supporting documents.

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[10] In advising BPS as to the IFB's structure, the consulting firm cited market research suggesting that the Driver CBA would limit the number of interested vendors. DESE also identified the Driver CBA as a contributing factor in BPS's OTP struggles.

[11] In its report of its fall 2019 review, DESE identified similar community concerns as the impetus for its review. DESE conducted a follow-up review in 2022, finding that many of the issues identified in its original report still existed.

OIG issued a summary of its findings on February 28, 2023. *See* **Exhibit 6**. While acknowledging BPS's intent to move forward with the contract, OIG emphasized the need for a single, comprehensive agreement that clearly outlined all terms, costs, performance expectations, and consequences for noncompliance. OIG also reiterated Transdev's past performance struggles, particularly its failure to consistently deliver students on time.[12] OIG also recommended that BPS develop a robust contract administration plan, track the effectiveness of its single-vendor model, and begin evaluating future procurement options by the third year of the contract to ensure that it is providing the best possible transportation services to students and families.

IV. PERFORMANCE & OVERSIGHT OF THE NEW CONTRACT: FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

BPS and Transdev executed a new contract (the "**New Contract**") on March 14, 2023. It represented a significantly more comprehensive and detailed agreement than the Original Contract, creating a more holistic and simplified inventory of the Parties' respective duties, responsibilities, and rights. The New Contract also includes financial incentives, whereby Transdev is entitled to a pre-set monetary bonus if it achieves certain goals. Through several provisions, the New Contract vests near complete authority to Transdev to effectuate the contract's provisions, from hiring to training. As part of this review, the Investigators assessed Transdev's performance by examining the New Contract provisions that directly implicate Transdev's safety-related efforts and BPS's oversight authority: record keeping and production, accident reporting, training, staffing, and auditing.[13]

In each section that follows, the Investigators summarize the review's findings, delineating for each the applicable New Contract provision(s) through which Transdev's performance and BPS's oversight were evaluated. Each section also itemizes and describes any applicable Transdev policies,[14] procedures, or training manuals that purport to guide its implementation of the New Contract. Where the Driver CBA impacts Transdev's ability to effectuate the New Contract's safety provisions, the Investigators reference the relevant Driver CBA provision(s). In short, the challenges presented by Transdev's poor data collection practices, identified by DESE in 2019, corroborated and documented by Transdev in its 2020 audit, and obliquely referenced by the OIG

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[12] The Investigation revealed that the technical issues identified by the OIG in 2022 have largely been addressed and that OTP performance is now accurately reported and tracked by BPS and Transdev.

[13] While not evaluated here, the New Contract also requires Transdev to track other Key Performance Indicators ("KPIs") that implicate the Parties' shared responsibility to provide safe and reliable school bus services for BPS students and families such as On Time Performance ("OTP") and "Shadow Incidents." Transdev's reporting policies distinguish "Accidents" from "Shadow Incidents," tracking each separately. For purposes of this Report, an "accident" is a collision involving a school bus. Conversely, an "incident" (not evaluated in this Report) is a reportable event such as a physical altercation on a bus, vandalism, or an injury unrelated to an accident. The largest subcategory of incidents is "Undeliverable Child" which refers to those instances in which a student's parent or guardian is not present at the bus stop to receive the student. Transdev and BPS then work collaboratively to contact the parent or guardian to ensure the student can be safely dropped off. In March 2025, for instance, Transdev reported 744 Shadow Incidents. Of these, 679 were classified as Undeliverable Children. BPS also tracks, separately, a category of "Student Incidents," as reflected in the Superintendent's Circular (the "**Superintendent's Circular**"). *See Policies and Procedures: Superintendent's Circulars - Boston Public Schools.*

[14] As a general matter, Transdev's company-wide policies apply to its BPS operations, but there are certain policies which cannot be applied due to the Driver CBA and thus have been replaced or do not exist in the context of the BPS contract.

in 2023 when it acknowledged the Parties' intent to execute the New Contract and advised BPS to develop a robust contract administration plan persist today as do the challenges posed by the Driver CBA. While the damage caused by the Freeport fire and the departures of key staff certainly contributed to these failures, they do not excuse them given the documented history of Transdev's struggles to consistently maintain an efficient and reliable record keeping system.

A. TRANSDEV FAILS TO MAINTAIN RESPONSIBLE RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES

Both the New Contract and state law require Transdev to maintain accurate and current driver records.

1. *Applicable Contract Provisions*

Specifically, the New Contract includes the following provisions requiring Transdev to collect, maintain, and produce to BPS certain records:

- **Section 3.4.21(G) Miscellaneous Personnel Matters:** Requires Transdev to maintain a current driver list that contains specific types of information, including evidence of a valid Commercial Driver's License ("**CDL**"), which BPS can request to review at any time.[15]

- **Section 9.1 Record Keeping, Audit Requirements, and Reporting; General Matters:** Requires Transdev to maintain records that support all operational and financial aspects of the contract, including personnel compliance, and keep them readily accessible for inspection by BPS.

- **Section 9.2 Record Keeping, Audit Requirements, and Reporting; Contractor Required Reporting:** Requires Transdev to produce Monthly Reporting Packages ("**MRPs**") with detailed updates on the six Functional Areas. Transdev and BPS officials are then expected to meet in working groups each month to review the respective MRPs for each Functional Area.

2. *Applicable Transdev Policies*

- **Electronic Training Record Policy**: Provides that all drivers must have an individual electronic record stored within Transdev's internal shared drive.[16] *See* **Exhibit 7**. The Electronic Training Record should reflect a driver's completion of both new hire training and ongoing retraining.

3. *Investigation Findings*

In the summary of its 2020 Audit, Transdev noted that certain driver records were difficult to locate, incomplete, or not readily accessible. *See* **Exhibit 2**. As previewed above, the

[15] The driver list must include all drivers' name, address, DOB, telephone number, age, CDL status, and the date on which criminal record and sexual offender registry checks were conducted.

[16] The Electronic Training Record Policy applies to all Transdev employees who hold a School Bus Certificate ("**SBC**"). The SBC is a state-required credential.

Investigators found that Transdev's record keeping system remains insufficient, as it is not centralized and several files appeared incomplete. These challenges, evidenced by Transdev's inability to readily locate and produce certain records and, in some instances, its failure to respond with complete and accurate information, hampered the Investigator's ability to fully evaluate Transdev's performance of the safety-related provisions of the New Contract. By way of example, and as explained in Section IV.C, the Investigators asked Transdev to select, on its own, a random sample of seven (7) accident reporting and driver training files. Over the course of several days that included follow-up requests based on the Investigators' own observations of the information available in Transdev's electronic filing system, Transdev continued to produce incomplete records, and in some cases, reports wholly unrelated to the original request.

The Investigation further revealed that Transdev has some records stored in an electronic file while also continuing to create and maintain paper versions of other records. Transdev reported that many of its paper records were lost in the Freeport fire, but it could not state, with any certainty, what was lost in the fire and what, if anything, could be replicated. Transdev officials went on to explain that it does not keep one single file for each driver but instead separates files for training, coaching, accidents, and HR-related matters. When asked where the different files were stored, Transdev officials could not confirm the location of all files or the extent to which these files are kept current.[17] As a result, the Investigators did not receive or review a full file, to include preventability determinations and any required post-accident training records, for any of the drivers involved in the seven accidents that Transdev randomly selected and produced at the Investigators' request.

As to those records that Transdev is contractually obligated to preserve and that BPS has the right to inspect, the Investigation revealed that while BPS does receive, annually, a list of all Transdev drivers, some of these lists do not include driver contact information. BPS reported that, since the April 28 Incident, it has begun exercising its right to inspect accident reporting data on a daily basis.[18] BPS continues to receive MRPs, which provide updates on the six Functional Areas. Specifically, the Safety MRPs include data on accident rates, driver training attendance, and Shadow Incident occurrences while the Human Resources MRPs list the number of staffing vacancies and related hiring efforts as well as a breakdown of the number and type of Driver CBA-related grievances filed and resolved each month.

The Functional Areas also correspond to six individual working groups. Each working group, which is comprised of BPS and Transdev personnel, meets monthly to review the MRPs and discuss Transdev's efforts to address any gaps. The Investigators reviewed several working group meeting agendas and found that they consisted mainly of high-level overviews of proposed discussion topics for each 30-minute meeting. Transdev could not furnish any working group meeting minutes, but BPS provided a collection of notes from multiple working group meetings across all Functional Areas dating back to 2023. BPS also provided the Investigators with a series of email communications and other materials related to Transdev's February 2025 MRPs, later

[17] These officials did note that they have confirmed since the April 28 Incident that all CDLs are up-to-date and that they rely, at least in part, on the Registry of Motor Vehicles tracking of CDL status to confirm the active status of their drivers' credentials.

[18] Prior to April 28, BPS periodically reviewed reports related to serious accidents such as one incident in which a school bus crashed into a house.

summarized in a February 2025 memorandum (the "**First MRP Memorandum**"), in which BPS officials identified several gaps in Transdev's monthly reporting, setting a July 2025 deadline for improvement. As to the Safety and Human Resources Functional Areas specifically, BPS affirmed its expectation that future MRP's detail actions that Transdev was taking to fill staffing vacancies and tasked Transdev with tying its reporting of certain safety-related incidents to identified goals.[19] *See* **Exhibit 8**.

As to the records underlying the data reflected in the Safety and Human Resources MRPs, such as accident reports, training files, and detailed lists of staffing vacancies, it does not appear that BPS regularly requested or inspected these records.[20] Since the April 28 Incident, however, BPS has begun requesting and receiving daily accident reporting data and has increased its oversight of Transdev's staffing priorities to ensure that key safety and training positions are timely filled.[21]

B. TRANSDEV'S DRIVER TRAINING FILES ARE INCOMPLETE AND UNRELIABLE

The record keeping challenges detailed above are best evidenced by Transdev's maintenance of driver training records. While Transdev deserves credit for its creation of a policy framework that emphasizes new hire training, evaluation, and continuous oversight as well as remedial training and coaching for drivers involved in accidents or who engage in unsafe behaviors, it could not accurately demonstrate that these training are consistently delivered.

1. *Applicable Contract Provision*

The New Contract includes the following provision related to training:

- **Section 3.4.9 Trainers:** In addition to staffing a Safety and Training Director, Transdev agrees to maintain, at a minimum, one (1) Trainer for every 70 bus drivers (1:70).

- **Section 7.10 Driver Training and Additional Emergency Training**: States that Transdev must provide all drivers with both the safety training required by law and the necessary additional training on bus operations, company policies, and safety procedures. Transdev is also expected to provide BPS annually with copies of all driver training plans as well as copies of completed training.

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[19] As previously noted, Transdev's reporting policies define certain several safety-related incidents: an "accident" is a collision involving a school bus; an "incident" (not evaluated in this Report) is a reportable event such as a physical altercation on a bus, vandalism, or an injury unrelated to an accident; and an "Undeliverable Child" refers to those instances in which a student's parent or guardian is not present at the bus stop to receive the student.

[20] BPS does request and inspect source data related to Transdev's OTP and Fleet Management-related reporting. However, the Functional Areas associated with those categories were not part of this Investigation.

[21] In a June 2025 memorandum to Transdev (the" **Second MRP Memorandum**"), BPS acknowledged Transdev's responsive efforts to the First MRP Memorandum and reiterated its expectations for future MRPs. *See* **Exhibit 9**.

2. *Applicable Transdev Policies & Training Programs*

Transdev has a robust policy framework for driver training that includes the following:

- **Driver Training Policy**: Sets out the training requirements for new hires, existing drivers, and drivers involved in accidents. See **Exhibit 10**.

- **New Hire Training**: Transdev requires each new hire to complete a minimum of 40 hours of classroom time, during which the drivers complete the Professional Operator Development program ("**PODP**") and take a written exam. New hires are then required to spend a minimum of 16 hours on a closed obstacle course to practice driving maneuvers, before completing an in-vehicle assessment.

- **Driver Evaluation Policy:** Requires an evaluation of each new hire 30 days from "first dispatch" and again within the first 75 days. According to the policy, these evaluations "give the Safety Manager/General Manager the opportunity to determine if the new driver meets [Transdev's] driving performance requirements before completion of his/her probationary period, and if appropriate, provide additional training before making a final retention decision." Other training, including an annual Behind the Wheel evaluation, is incorporated into this policy. *See* **Exhibit 11**.

- **Annual Training Requirements Policy:** In addition to the completion of the requisite eight (8) hours of training to maintain state certification, each driver is required to attend a safety meeting each month unless they are on approved leave. *See* **Exhibit 12**.

3. *Investigation Findings*

Transdev presented In-Service Cards that purport to reflect the number of required annual training hours each driver has completed to maintain their credentials under Massachusetts law as well as any training completed to satisfy the Annual Training Requirements Policy. The Investigator's review of the In-Service Cards associated with two drivers who, according to records provided by Transdev, were involved in preventable accidents during the New Contract period, indicated that while both completed the state-required eight (8) hours of training, neither were recorded as having attended a Transdev safety meeting each month in either of the years reflected on the card. As for the Driver Evaluation Policy, one Transdev official told the Investigators that it "does its best" to evaluate new hires after their first 30 days, 60 days, and 90 days of driving. However, Transdev could not produce any documents confirming that the identified drivers, one of whom was hired in 2023, completed any of the new hire evaluations and at which interval.

Further, the In-Service Cards do not track the completion of new hire training or annual driver evaluations and, as a result, anyone looking to inspect a complete summary of a driver's training record would be required to access multiple file repositories, both paper and electronic. As such, the Investigators were unable to conclude whether Transdev complies with the contractual requirements, or its own internal policies related to driver training. The Investigation also revealed that Transdev consistently operates at or below the contractually required ratio of 1:70 trainers to

drivers. While it appears that Transdev is now fully staffed at the trainer position,[22] it is unclear how Transdev could realistically fulfill its ambitious training goals as noted in a summary produced by its national team after a May 2025 on-site assessment (the "**2025 Site Visit Summary**"). *See* **Exhibit 13**. In evaluating Transdev's training capacity, the reviewers cited the "company-recommended" ratio of 1:25, extrapolating that "the total number of [BPS] trainers "should be 30."[23] *Id.*

RECOMMENDATION: ***Transdev should develop a more centralized and streamlined system for maintaining driver files, whereby it can more easily access a driver's training record, identify gaps, and monitor each driver's CDL status. The Parties should also consider modifying the New Contract to allocate funds for the creation of additional administrative and compliance roles.***

RECOMMENDATION: ***Transdev should expand its training staff to better align with company-wide guidelines. The Parties should consider modifying the New Contract to increase the 1:70 minimum ratio of trainers to drivers.***

C. TRANSDEV LACKS RELIABLE, DATA-DRIVEN EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF ITS TRAINING AND COACHING PROGRAMS ON ACCIDENT REDUCTION

Transdev's inability to maintain accurate and complete training data also undermines the perceived impact its training programs have on the reduction of preventable accidents.[24] While the existing programs, described below, are intended to serve as the operational execution of Transdev's internal safety policies and ensure that drivers receive adequate instruction both before first operating a bus and following an accident, Transdev does not assess whether the programs have the intended effect of reducing preventable accidents at the individual driver level. Additionally, the Investigation revealed that the Driver CBA's impact on Transdev's implementation of its safety protocols is most acute here.

1. *Applicable Contract Provisions*

- **Section 7.7 Accidents**: Requires Transdev to create and submit to BPS a written report of any accident involving a school bus within 24 hours of occurrence.

2. *Applicable Transdev Policies & Training Programs*

- **Incident Preventability Policy**: Provides the standard by which Transdev evaluates accident preventability. *See* **Exhibit 14**.

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[22] One staff member was out on a leave of absence at the time of the Investigation.

[23] Recently, Transdev redeployed at least five (5) trainers to BPS from other locations to assist.

[24] Since 2019, National Interstate was BPS's insurer for its school bus fleet. Each year, National Interstate provided BPS with a loss control report detailing its observations of the applicable driver safety programs and providing recommendations for improvement. A review of these reports reveals that National Interstate consistently advised BPS of the need to upgrade its driver training programs. Although Transdev announced that it would be implementing an enhanced defensive-driving program in the spring of 2025, National Interstate opted to decline BPS's request to renew its insurance policy due to the increased frequency of liability claims. *See* **Exhibit 15**. BPS has since engaged a new insurer.

- **Safety Policies and Procedures Manual, Section F.21**: Requires a driver to complete retraining and receive a satisfactory evaluation following a preventable accident. The manual also describes Transdev's progressive discipline mechanism for drivers who exhibit unsafe behaviors or are involved in multiple preventable accidents. Under the policy, three (3) preventable accidents in a 24-month period (the "**Lookback Period**") may result in termination (the "**3-Strike Policy**"). *See* **Exhibit 16**.

- **Incident Reporting Policy:**[25] Reinforces Transdev's contractual obligation to report accidents and requires drivers to immediately report any accidents to the Safety Desk for prompt initiation of a thorough review. *See* **Exhibit 17**.

- **Drive Cam Coaching:** Transdev distinguishes between driver training and driver coaching. Transdev officials stated that the purpose behind separating training from coaching is that the former is generally focused on compliance measures and the latter focuses on improving driver behaviors. In 2020, Transdev installed the Lytx DriveCam software ("**DriveCam**") on every school bus. DriveCam tracks traditionally unsafe driver behaviors in real time and sends an alert to a central dashboard whenever one of the 66 enumerated behaviors occurs. *See* **Exhibit 18**. Each unsafe behavior has a corresponding numerical value, and drivers receive a score. These scores accumulate over time. According to one official, it is Transdev's goal to keep driver scores below 40. DriveCam flags a driver as "Due For Coaching" when the driver exceeds the risk score threshold in a rolling 7-day period. According to the Safety Related Violations Policy, drivers who are coached three (3) or more times a month for the same behaviors may be sent for retraining,

- **Drive to a Better You:** Transdev officials describe this new coaching model, implemented early this year, as a 30-day program, split between classroom and on-road coaching offered instruction tailored to a driver's individual needs, based on the behaviors trigged in DriveCam.

3. *Investigation Findings*

To gauge the potential impact of Transdev's safety programs on individual driver behavior and accident reduction, the Investigators sought to review Transdev's accident reporting processes and associated training records. Transdev does not appear to have a formal policy or uniform practice for what is typically contained in an accident file, but the Investigators understand that the company creates Accident Report Packages ("ARPs"), the components of which are stored electronically and in paper form. The following illustrates the process as gleaned from interviews and records reviewed during the Investigation:

[25] The policy's effective date is June 20, 2025. According to Transdev officials, it was drafted prior to the April 28 Incident but requisite internal reviews and approvals delayed implementation.



a. Accident Reporting

While the New Contract contemplates a 24-hour submission window for submission of accident reports, the Driver CBA gives each driver the right to consult with a Union steward while drafting the report.[26] According to BPS and Transdev officials, drivers do not always adhere to the 24-hour mandate, citing the inability to consult with a Union steward within the allotted timeframe. The Driver CBA also provides that any accident not resulting in at least $800 in damage shall be deemed an "incident," rather than an "accident."[27] The damages threshold impacts Transdev's ability to impose discipline but does not relieve the driver from meeting the 24-hour accident reporting deadline or from attending remedial training.

b. Preventable Accident Determination

Transdev's Incident Preventability policy defines a preventable accident as "a crash or injury where the driver could have, but failed, to properly identify an incident-producing situation soon enough to take reasonable and prudent action to avoid a crash or injury. After an accident, Transdev's Safety & Training Manager reviews the reports produced by both the driver and Road Safety Supervisor, the DriveCam footage from the accident, and any other relevant evidence to determine whether the accident was preventable.

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[26] The Driver CBA provides for the appointment and funding of Union stewards who are stationed at each Transdev location to respond to bus driver's concerns and to support drivers in protecting their contract rights.

[27] Incidents, as defined in the Driver CBA, are different than Shadow Incidents, as tracked in Transdev's MRPs and Student Incidents, as reflected in the Superintendent's Circular. Pursuant to the Driver CBA, the threshold amount increased to $800 on July 1, 2023, following a series of incremental increases beginning in July 2017.

c. Accident Review Committee

The Driver CBA also establishes an Accident Review Committee (ARC), consisting of seven members: three Union representatives; three management representatives; and one neutral party agreed upon by both sides. Once Transdev determines that an accident was preventable, the driver is notified and offered the option of accepting the determination or appealing to the ARC. The ARC purports to meet weekly but, according to both Transdev and BPS, scheduling conflicts occasionally cause delays in convening a full panel. The driver remains on administrative leave until the ARC hears the appeal and either upholds or reverses the preventability determination. In some instances, drivers complete post-accident retraining before the ARC meets and makes a final preventability determination. In the aftermath of the April 28 Incident, BPS officials began attending ARC hearings as observers rather than deliberating members. According to one BPS official, the three Union representatives have refused to participate in any ARC hearing where BPS officials are present, leaving just three management representatives and effectively halting the ARC process.

d. Post-Accident Training & Coaching

According to Transdev officials, if a driver is in a preventable accident, the driver is required to complete a certain amount of training before returning to service. These officials reported that the assigned trainer reviews the accident reports and any accompanying video to determine the contributing factors and then tailors the training to address those factors. Typically, this training can be anywhere from two (2) to eight (8) hours, but Transdev noted that it can be more extensive depending on the driver's needs. The training often begins in the classroom and, when possible, concludes with a re-creation of the accident on a closed course where the driver explains what they could have done differently. The driver does not return to the road until the trainer confirms that the contributing factors have been addressed.

DriveCam coaching and Drive to a Better You are additional Transdev programs aimed at reducing unsafe behaviors, even in the absence of preventable accidents. Transdev strongly recommends, but cannot, pursuant to the Driver CBA, require driver attendance. Despite their non-mandatory nature, Transdev officials told the Investigators that drivers rarely refuse to participate but that scheduling conflicts do create logistical challenges. Once a driver is flagged as "Due for Coaching" in the Lytx system, a member of Transdev's DriveCam team will tailor a coaching plan to the specific behaviors at issue. The coaching sessions are relatively brief depending on the specific behavior(s) identified. In contrast, the Drive to a Better You program consists of more extensive coaching in both the classroom and on the road over the course of 30 days. Transdev currently utilizes the Drive to a Better You program for its highest scoring drivers. According to Transdev, if a driver's score has not improved after completion of the program, the driver will be asked to repeat the course. As previously noted, Transdev only recently implemented its Drive to a Better You program.

In an April 2025 presentation, Transdev highlighted the improvements in DriveCam scoring in the past year:

Driver Improvements Year Over Year

*The Use of the Lytx DriveCam systems have allowed the Safety Team to identify the Drivers who exhibit Unsafe Behaviors.

*With this data, we can Coach these drivers on correcting their behaviors

NAME	4/2024 Score	3/2025 Score	% Improvement
Driver 1	270	28	91%
Driver 2	216	12	96%
Driver 3	211	109	52%
Driver 4	143	85	59%

Data-driven Driver Improvement- 2024 to Pres

26

To better assess the correlation between coaching, remedial training, and preventable accidents, the Investigators used the ARPs related to the seven (7) drivers involved in the accidents Transdev selected and provided as part of this review. As noted, the Investigators asked Transdev to provide at least one ARP from a specified list of months, leaving Transdev to select which files from each month to send for review. The Investigators found that these ARPs were incomplete, *e.g.*, missing one or several of the expected documents. Transdev officials were unable to locate or explain the missing documents and provided the same materials as well as other unrelated materials in response to the Investigators' follow up requests. Based on the limited documentation that was provided, the Investigators concluded that three (3) of the ARPs involved what a fair interpretation of Transdev policy would characterize as preventable accidents and four (4) ARPs, applying that same criteria, involved nonpreventable accidents. The Investigators asked Transdev officials to locate any additional ARPs for the drivers involved in the apparently preventable accidents and found that these additional ARPs were likewise incomplete.

Transdev has not provided data—or offered any company systems that track such data—demonstrating that its PODP program reduces accident rates among new drivers, nor has it shown that post-accident training leads to measurable improvements in driver behavior or a reduction in repeat incidents. The Investigators are mindful of Transdev's recent changes to its PODP training curriculum which now incorporate the Smith System™ for defensive driving. In its most recent, and last, on-site assessment report for BPS, National Interstate cited as a "critical recommendation" the need for BPS/Transdev to "implement a defensive driving program which includes classroom and behind-the-wheel training." *See* **Exhibit 19**. With this year's addition of the Smith System™ to its new driver training program, Transdev will ideally fulfill this "critical" need. However, there still exists a need to implement a data-driven method of evaluating the effectiveness of this and other new initiatives at the individual driver level.

The records related to one (1) of the seven (7) drivers ("**Driver Doe**") illustrate this point. According to the ARP associated with Driver Doe's most-recent accident, deemed preventable,

the remedial training evaluator noted that Driver Doe needed "extensive training" over the course of 11 hours before being permitted to return to service. The Investigation further revealed that Driver Doe, hired in 2023, had been involved in seven (7) accidents since joining Transdev, one of which appears to have involved student passengers:

Date	Description/Notes	Preventability Determination
May 2023	Driver Doe backed into a fire hydrant.	N/A
Sept. 2023	Driver Doe hit a ladder affixed to the top of an adjoining vehicle.	N/A
Sept. 2023	Driver Doe pulled over to report the above accident. As he pulled out of the parking space, he struck another car.	N/A
Oct. 2023	Driver Doe struck a parked car.	N/A
Oct. 2024	Driver Doe backed into a parked car while leaving the bus yard.	N/A
Nov. 2024	Driver Doe backed into two parked cars while attempting a left-hand turn. Students on bus.	Preventable

Based on a review of the associated reports, it appears that Driver Doe was eligible for discipline, up to termination pursuant to the 3-Strikes Policy, as early as October 2023 but no later than November 2024. However, the Driver CBA's impact on Transdev's policy is three-fold here. First, the Driver CBA provides that any accidents that do not involve a third party and result in damages totaling less than $800 are "incidents" rather than "accidents" for purposes of the 3-Strike Policy. Second, the CBA provides that, where Transdev uses DriveCam footage to determine that an accident was preventable, the 24-month Lookback Period shrinks to 13 months. Lastly, any attempted discipline of Driver Doe is likely to have triggered a grievance, further extending the timeline for implementation of any remedial action, including discipline or termination.[28]

The ARPs associated with Driver Doe's accidents do not offer much clarity. For instance, only one ARP, the package associated with the November 2024 accident, included a preventability determination. The accompanying letter characterized the accident, the only one to involve students, as Driver Doe's second preventable accident in 24 months, resulting in a three-day suspension. It is unclear from the remaining ARPs, all incomplete, which of the previous six accidents was deemed preventable, and the Investigators could not discern which of these events qualified as an "accident" under the Driver CBA and which were "incidents." Further, the ARPs did not include any ARC findings or notes. Transdev officials told the Investigators that the

[28] The Driver CBA sets out the 3-step process by which drivers can bring grievances. If a grievance is not resolved through discussions with Transdev officials, the driver may submit the matter to arbitration. The Human Resources MRPs include the number of grievances filed and resolved. Since July 2023, there have been approximately 64 grievances brought related to discipline and 18 grievances brought in response to termination decisions.

associated ARC records were either lost in the Freeport fire or stored in the computer files of a recently departed employee.

The Investigators also found that Driver Doe received DriveCam coaching 11 times for unsafe braking and/or proper following distance since 2023. The abridged investigation timeframe did not permit an evaluation of other ARPs or driver files, but Driver Doe's records highlight the aforementioned poor record keeping practices and raise questions of whether Transdev's training and coaching systems are having their intended impact. There is no indication that the DriveCam coaching program helped prevent Driver Doe from any additional accidents, and Driver Doe's recurrent need for coaching for the same behaviors suggests that the coaching was not being effectively retained. According to records provided by Transdev, Driver Doe's most recent DriveCam score was 65, placing Driver Doe above Transdev's identified threshold.

Similarly, Transdev has not produced evidence linking its training and coaching efforts to a company-wide decline in overall accident frequency. The New Contract provides a financial incentive whereby Transdev is eligible for a $100,000 annual incentive if it maintains a total accident frequency rate ("**AFR**") of fewer than 3.0 accidents per 100,000 miles.[29] The AFR is calculated by aggregating the total number of preventable accidents and nonpreventable accidents.[30] Transdev officials stated that reducing the AFR is a primary focus for the company and the Investigators' review of MRPs in this Functional Area confirm that reduction of AFR is identified as a goal in each reporting period. The tables below illustrate Transdev's reported accident totals for the past two school years. The MRPs did not include the corresponding quarterly AFRs. However, BPS officials report that Transdev has yet to achieve an AFR below 3.0 since the New Contract was executed.



[29] According to BPS officials, this is the industry standard for an AFR threshold.



The absence of a data-driven mechanism for evaluating its training effectiveness prevents Transdev from determining whether the initiatives detailed above are the right, or best, means of ensuring driver safety. According to a non-BPS transportation official the Investigators interviewed, a data-driven analysis of new driver training and accident frequency in his district revealed that new drivers experienced higher instances of accidents and unsafe behaviors in their second year than in their first year. As such, his district dedicated additional training resources to second year drivers. The Investigators are not suggesting that Transdev fully replicate this analysis. Rather, the Investigators merely recommend that Transdev conduct its own analysis of data to identify any existing trends so that it can provide additional support to cohorts of drivers that may be in need.

Transdev could also use its existing data to evaluate the effectiveness of its in-house CDL training. The Investigation revealed that a nationwide driver shortage that severely hampered the transportation industry forced Transdev to hire non-commercial driver license holders and create its own CDL training program. An assessment of the training's effectiveness could help Transdev identify potentially unsafe drivers before accidents occur.[31] The Investigators acknowledge Transdev's efforts to maintain robust training and coaching programs and appreciate its continued commitment to safety. However, without an evidence-based approach to its review of its training programs to determine impact on individual driver behavior, it is unclear whether drivers most in need of remedial training, or removal, will be identified. The Investigators also recognize and appreciate the Driver CBA's impact on any expanded training or disciplinary process.

RECOMMENDATION: ***Transdev should develop a data-driven system that directly links its driver training and coaching programs to accident data. Such a system would allow both Transdev and BPS to measure concrete progress towards their stated safety goals, rather than drawing anecdotal conclusions based on fragmented or unsupported processes. The New Contract***

[31] Transdev resumed its practice of hiring only CDL-certified drivers in 2024.

should be modified to support the hiring of additional data analysts to support Transdev in this effort.

D. NEITHER TRANSDEV NOR BPS HAS IMPLEMENTED MEANINGFUL AND SUSTAINED AUDITING AND OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS

The Investigators reviewed how BPS manages and supervises the safety-related provisions of the New Contract and the degree to which BPS confirms Transdev's compliance with its responsibilities under the contract. As described in Section III(C), BPS commissioned the 2020 Audit of Transdev's performance in certain functional areas, the results of which prompted Transdev and BPS to work closely together to identify areas of improvement. In the lead up to and following the execution of the New Contract, BPS maintained that level of oversight in areas such as OTP and Fleet Management but appears to have relaxed some of the accountability measures, specifically in the Safety and Human Resources Functional Areas.[32]

1. *Applicable Contract Provisions*

- **Section 9.1 Record Keeping, Audit Requirements, and Reporting; General Requirements**: Provides that BPS has the right to audit Transdev at any time to review Transdev's operations and performance. The New Contract contains additional provisions outlining situations in which Transdev is expected to share information with BPS.

As previously detailed, the New Contract includes several provisions authorizing BPS to access certain information.

2. *Applicable Transdev Policies*

Transdev does not have any applicable policies on internal audit processes. However, one national Transdev official told the Investigators that, while the company has no policy dictating the number and frequency of site visits by its regional safety leaders, those visits, "when they occur," conclude with the submission of a visit summary detailing any recommendations for improvement in identified areas of concern. When asked to provide records of any such visits to Transdev's Boston facilities since the October 2020 Audit, Transdev responded that due to high turnover in key positions, locally and nationally, it was unable to retrieve any reports reflecting site visits or other assessments before the April 28 Incident.

As previously noted, in May 2025, Transdev's corporate team did conduct an on-site assessment of two of the three BPS bus yards and produced the 2025 Site Visit Report. *See* **Exhibit 12.** The report identified several issues, including questionable processes for managing driver credentials, inconsistent quality and/or documentation of coaching, and several vacant safety-related positions—issues also identified by the Investigators. Within days of providing Investigators with the 2025 Site Visit Report, Transdev issued an addendum to the 2025 Site Visit Report, intending to correct certain observations. *See* **Exhibit 20**. The addendum noted the report

[32] As noted above, in the First MRP Memorandum (February 2025) and Second MRP Memorandum (June 2025), BPS identified gaps in the MRPs and reiterated its expectations for all MRPs moving forward.

writer's recent assumption of the Regional Safety Director's role and explained that the details of the Freeport fire and the electronic file sharing system were not adequately communicated to the new hire in advance of the visit.

3. *Investigation Findings*

The 2025 Site Visit Report reaffirmed numerous gaps in Transdev's systems and policies, many of which appear to have been long-term issues as reported in the 2020 Audit. Transdev has not conducted, and BPS has not commissioned a similarly comprehensive review since that time. Nevertheless, the Investigators found that many of the issues identified in the 2020 Audit continue to exist today, as evidenced by Transdev's deficient record keeping systems and inability to show a measurable impact of its training and coaching on safety outcomes. As detailed above, the New Contract followed a period of sustained oversight by BPS of Transdev's performance, described by one BPS official as a "trust but verify" approach to management of the Original Contract. Many of the performance metrics and reporting systems created during that period were incorporated into the New Contract's safety provisions, which Transdev has near total authority to implement, subject to the Driver CBA. BPS subsequently modified its "trust but verify" approach to one described by other BPS officials as focusing "more on outputs than inputs," with increased reliance on Transdev's industry experience. While the Investigators are not advocating for a return to what some might have viewed as micromanagement of Transdev's operations, the Investigation revealed that BPS has not fully leveraged its contractual right to audit and inspect Transdev's operations and related data.

As detailed in Section IV(A), BPS continues to receive MRPs and attend monthly meetings for each Functional Area. Since the April 28 Incident, members of Transdev's national safety leadership team have begun attending the pre-existing daily BPS/Transdev meeting and BPS is currently receiving timelier access to school bus accident data. Similarly, Transdev has reassigned personnel from other geographic locales to Boston to fill, on an interim basis, key safety and training positions and has guaranteed that those assignments will remain in effect until the roles are filled by permanent hires. The Investigators commend these efforts as meaningful steps towards a more accountable partnership.

RECOMMENDATION: ***Transdev should ensure that it conducts and documents on-site assessments on a consistent basis, perhaps bi-annually. BPS should also introduce its own regular cadence of performance audits, including unannounced on-site spot checks, to confirm Transdev's performance of the safety-related provisions of the New Contract. BPS should increase its contract management staffing to support these oversight efforts.***

V. CONCLUSION

The improvement opportunities identified in this Report do not explain why tragic events like the April 28 Incident happen. Sadly, the related recommendations, even if wholly adopted and perfectly implemented, cannot prevent recurrence. In preparing the above observations and recommendations, the Investigators were mindful of the tremendous undertaking involved in providing safe, reliable and cost-effective transportation to more than 22,000 BPS students each day. The Investigators found the individuals tasked with day-to-day management and

implementation of the BPS/Transdev contractual relationship to be hard-working and sincerely dedicated to a mission that is seemingly overwhelming in its scope.

As stated above, our evaluation of performance and oversight of the New Contract's safety-related provisions did not encompass the contract's other Functional Areas. These include management of the entire school bus fleet as well as management and analysis of existing routes, run times, and traffic patterns to ensure on-time performance. Adding to the work's complexity are the challenges posed by the Driver CBA and the City of Boston's ignominious designation as the "most collision prone city" in the United States. These challenges do not excuse the April 28 Incident. However, the Investigation revealed that the Parties are already working towards improvement in several areas. As we look ahead, the Investigators are optimistic that this continued collaboration will instill, within the BPS community, confidence that what *can* be done by the Parties as relates to the safety-related provisions of the New Contract *is* being done by the Parties.

VI. EXHIBIT LIST

1. *May 23, 2025, City of Boston Announcement of Independent Investigation*
2. *October 30, 2020*, *Transdev Internal Safety Audit*
3. *January 7, 2020, National Interstate Insurance Risk Management Report for BPS*
4. *February 6, 2020, BPS Response to National Interstate Insurance Risk Management Report*
5. *October 28, 2022, IFB Response Letter to BPS from Potential Vendor*
6. *February 28, 2023, OIG Audit Cover Letter to Superintendent Skipper*
7. *Transdev, N.A., Standard Operating Procedure #2024-02: Electronic Training Record Policy*
8. *February 27, 2025, BPS Memorandum to Transdev Regarding Monthly Reporting Packages*
9. *Transdev, N.A., Safety Policy #12: Driver Training*
10. *June 4, 2025, BPS Memorandum to Transdev Regarding Monthly Reporting Packages*
11. *Transdev, N.A., Safety Policy #14: Driver Evaluation*
12. *Transdev, N.A., Standard Operating Procedure #2023-22: Annual Training Requirements*
13. *Transdev, N.A., May 2025 Safety Site Visit Summary*

14. *March 4, 2025, National Interstate Insurance Notice of Non-Renewal to BPS*

15. *Transdev, N.A., Safety Policy #2: Incident Preventability Determination*

16. *Transdev, N.A., Safety Policies and Procedures Manual: Section F.21*

17. *Transdev, N.A., Incident Reporting Policy*

18. *Transdev, N.A., Lytx Behavioral Matrix*

19. *January 21, 2025, National Interstate Insurance Risk Management Report for BPS*

20. *Transdev, N.A., Addendum to May 2025 Site Visit Summary*